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ABSTRACT
One of the most important social problems in Colombia is the shortage of adequate
affordable housing for the low income households. By the year 2000, Bogota alone had a
housing shortage of about 540 thousand houses concentrated mainly on the three lower
socioeconomic levels which represented 86% of the population of the city. As a response
to the problem, the central government has traditionally supported the ownership of
affordable housing through direct subsidies granted to qualifying low income households.
However, given the constraints in the resources of capital available in the country, and
the magnitude of the problem, the government support has only been able to solve part of
the housing needs of low income families. The promotion of low income rental housing
is an alternative that combined with the traditional support for home ownership will
better serve the housing needs of the low income households in the country. This thesis
aims to analyze the financial feasibility of the development of low income rental housing
in the country by analyzing the case of Bogota.
Based on an analysis of the American affordable rental housing policy, the thesis
suggests a mechanism of government subsidies for the development of low income rental
housing in the country. Through innovations in the capital markets in the United States,
the government has been able to attract private equity for the promotion of affordable
rental housing. Based on the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program in the United
States, the thesis develops a financial model in order to assess the level of support that the
central government in Colombia would have to provide to turn the development of
affordable rental housing attractive to private investors.
The thesis concludes that by leveraging private capital, the Colombian government could
promote the development of low income rental housing in the country_ It finally
recommends a new scheme for low income housing subsidies that will attract private
equity for the promotion of both ownership and rental low income housing.
Thesis Supervisor: Fred Moavenzadeh
Title: James Mason Crafts Professor of Systems Engineering and Civil and
Environmental Engineering
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INTRODUCTION
Given the shortage of affordable housing in Colombia, the central government has
supported the ownership of low income housing through subsidies given to qualifying
low income households. However, there are many low income families that even with
the subsidy of the government are not able to acquire a house and are forced to live in
rental housing. For instance, in Bogota 61 % of the low income families live in rental
housing. I Nevertheless, the Colombian government doesn't have a policy to promote the
development of low income rental housing in the country. This thesis aims to analyze the
feasibility of a program that would promote the development of affordable housing in
Colombia. Specifically, it analyzes the case of Bogota and its main objective is to find
out the government's level of support needed in order to turn this activity attractive for
private investors. Based on the results of the analyses, it will assess the viability of the
development of low income rental housing in Colombia. It will propose a program that
combined with the current government support for affordable housing ownership would
better serve the housing needs of low income households and it would constitute a more
comprehensive housing policy in the country.
The first chapter of the thesis presents the current condition of the low income housing
industry in Bogota. It explains the magnitude of the problem and the efforts of the
government in order to alleviate it. It describes the scheme used by MetroVivienda, a
state owned industrial and commercial company created in Bogota in order to promote
the development of low income housing. The current scheme of the central government
housing subsidies is also portrayed. Finally, it presents the development of low income
rental housing as an alternative to serve the housing needs of the low income families in
the country.
Chapter two looks at the financial innovations in the real estate industry in the United
States. Low income multifamily rental housing properties are part of the real estate
1 Economistas Urbanos Asociadas Ltda., 2002, Bogota.
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industry. Hence, it is important to understand and review the financial mechanisms that
have allowed the real estate industry to access greater and more efficient sources of
capital. In the debt markets it reviews the development of the commercial mortgage
backed securities market and in the equity market it analyzes the development of the real
estate investment trusts.
Chapter three presents an analysis of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)
program used in the United Stated to promote the development of affordable rental
housing. The LIHTC program has been the most successful policy for the promotion of
affordable housing in the United States. Since the beginning of the program in 1986, it
has promoted more that 1.2 million low income rental housing units. The program has
been able to successfully bring together private equity investors, lenders, private
developers and state agencies in order to produce affordable rental housing.
Based on the main concepts of the LIHTC program employed in the United States,
chapter four evaluates the government's level of support needed in order to turn the
development of low income rental housing attractive for private investors in Colombia.
The analysis is focused in the current conditions of Bogota.
Although this thesis is about financing low income rental housing, after the analysis of
the LIHTC program, it is evident that with some alterations the program could also be
used to subsidy the ownership of low income housing in Colombia. Chapter five will lay
out those basic adjustments to the LIHTC program and will propose a new scheme of
subsidies in the country.
The thesis concludes that by leveraging private capital, the Colombian government could
promote both the ownership and the rental of low income housing in the country.
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CHAPTER ONE - LOW INCOME HOUSING
INDUSTRY IN BOGOTA
1.1 Review of the Present Condition
Housing is one of the most critical social problems in Bogota, the capital of the
Colombia. In the year 2000, Bogota was a city of approximately 6.5 million inhabitants.
It had 1.68 million homes, 3.85 persons per home, and only 1.14 million housing units2.
Thus, there was a housing shortage of about 540 thousand houses. The deficit can be also
expressed using an index of 1.48 homes per house. Furthennore, this shortage is focused
in the low income population of the city. 96% of the deficit is on the three lower
socioeconomic levels which represent 86% of the population.
Table 1.1
Socioeconomic Characterization of Bogota (Figures in thousands - Year 2000)
INCOME POPULATION HOUSING UNITS HOMES SHORTAGE
SOCIO Monthly
ECONOMIC Minimum
LEVEL Wage No. % No. % No % No % Relative
:c.,.;:.;;:> .1'''' I ~/:f:); <J \;.>~: ,c u ;421 6,5% 76 6.7% 94 56% 18 3..3%
,,':ir,:;2 ;- :3"iL:~ 2,31S 35,7% 366 32.2% 630 37.4'%' 264 4$,g%
'i'tiJi,:.ri</ igc~·3·~'.·'r "1,g54 44'.0% . 469 4].2% 708 42.1'0/0 ... 240 44.1)%
4 5-8 488 7.5% 129 11.3% ]41 8.4% 13 2.2%
5 8 -16 194 3.0% 42 3.7% 49 2,9% 7 1.2%
6 >16 140 2.2% 43 3.8% 42 2.5% (0\ -0.1%
68 1.0% 14 1.2% 18 lJ% 4 0.8%
TOTAL 6,484 100.0% 1,138 100.0% 1,683 100.0% 545 100.0%
Source: DAPD, Economic Sub direction. Bogota,
.... 4f;~%
8.9%
14.1%
-1.1%
23.0%
32.4%
The Administrative Department of Planning of Bogota (DAPD in Spanish) established in
2000 the goal of reducing the housing shortage from a deficit of 1.48 to 1.37 homes per
house by the year 2010. According to DAPD projections, the city will have a population
of approximately 8.1 million by 2010. Meanwhile, homes will increase more than
proportionally to population since it is expected that the average size of homes will
decrease from 3.85 to 3.74 persons per home (Table 1.2). Hence, in order to achieve this
goal, the city needs to build 44,000 units per year during the current decade. Given the
2 Projections DAPD, Technical Document support to POT 2000.
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income distribution of the city, approximately 38,000 units should correspond to low
income housing.
2000 6,484,967 1,683,267 1,138,465 5.70
2001 6,637,212 1,729,507 1,182,545 5.61
2002 6,793,032 1,777,017 1,226,625 5.54
2003 6,952,510 1,825,832 1,270,705 5.47
2004 7,115,731 1,875,988 1,314,784 5.41
2005 7,282,785 1,927,522 1,358,864 5.36
2006 7,437,431 1,972,579 1,402,944 5.30
2007 7,595,362 2,018,690 1,447,024 5.25
2008 7,756,645 2,065,879 1,491,104 5.20
2009 7,921,354 2,114,170 1,535,184 5.16
5.12
However, historically the formal construction sector In the city hasn't matched this
requirement. During the 90s, the construction of low income housing by the formal sector
average 10,600 units per year. This figure was well below the required goal of 38,000.
Since 2000, a new trend in the formal construction in Bogota has emerged; As seen in
figure 1.1 below the construction on low income housing has risen considerably but still
misses the city's administration goal by more that 12,000 units.
Figure 1.1
Evolution of Formal Housing Construction in Bogota
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Source: MetroVivienda, Bogota.
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There are several constraints that limit the supply of low income housing in Bogota by
the formal sector making it impossible to keep up with the demand. The main issues are
related to low profit margins in the development of affordable housing and the
complicated and long bureaucratic processes before actual construction. In Bogota, it
could take up to fours years between the beginning of a new project and its final sale
making developments very costly and risky. During this time, not only costs were
incurred, but also urbanism norms could change altering, and in some cases, ending the
viability of a project.3
1.2 MetroVivienda
On December of 1998, the city council of Bogota created MetroVivienda, a state owned
industrial and commercial company, in order to promote the development of low income
housing in the city. It would aim to reduce the problems describe above among others.
Part of the new trend in the construction of formal housing in Bogota towards affordable
units since the year 2000 as seen in figure 1.1 can be attributable to the work of
MetroVivienda.
The company is an example of a local government initiative to support the supply of
affordable housing in Bogota. MetroVivienda promotes large scale low income housing
developments with an average size of 100 hectares and 10.000 houses per project. The
company acts as a second floor real estate developer under a structure with several
advantages. Essentially, it acquires large pieces of undeveloped land, builds the main
infrastructure and high quality secondary urbanism, and sells urbanized land to private
developers that in tum build low income housing units at a determined maximum price.
The price of urbanized land doesn't include the added value that a private developer
would include due to the process of urbanization. As a consequence, the final buyer of a
house obtains an implicit subsidy of the city.
3 MetroVivienda, Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota, D.C. "Ciudadela EI Reereo, Memorial del modelo de gesti6n de
MetroVivienda", Bogota, 2002.
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Figure 1.2
Schemes of Government Support to the Supply
of Low Income Housin in Colombia
TRADITIONAL SCHEME METROVIVIENDA SCHEME
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Source: MetroVivienda , Bogota.
Figure 1.2 presents the structure of the traditional scheme of government support to the
supply of affordable housing in Colombia and the scheme used by MetroVivienda. The
second floor real estate developer structure used by MetroVivienda has several
advantages over the traditional scheme:
• Investment per unit: Under the traditional scheme the government would finance the
construction of each housing unit, while in MetroVivienda's scheme government
resources finance only the acquisition and the urbanization of land. The investment
per unit under the new scheme is five times less than in the traditional scheme.
Capital rotation: In MetroVivienda's scheme the average time to recover the
government investment is four times faster that in the traditional system. The
duration of one of MetroVivienda' s project is around five years and the average time
to recover the capital invested is 2-2.5 years while in the traditional scheme this time
is in average 8-10 years. This means that in a given period of time MetroVivienda
can promote four times more houses that the traditional system.
Credit Recovery: Historically, in Colombia, residential mortgages issued directly by
the government to low income families only have recovered approximately 40% of
the capital. Under MetroVivienda's scheme, the urbanized land is sold directly to
private developers whose payments have bank guarantees. Because of this,
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MetroVivienda' s credit recovery risk is substantially limited. In this case the new
system is 2.5 times more efficient.
Other advantages of the scheme of MetroVivienda include:
The company is financially self sustainable. Beside its initial capitalization, it doesn't
require transfer of additional government resources.
Captures the added value of urbanism and transfers it to low income families.
Generates economies of scale in the use of infrastructure.
It has low operating expenses equivalent to approximately 1.2% of investment.
It prevents the development of illegal housing and saves to the city $2,850 dollars per
house in costs related to the upgrade of illegal settlements.
Overcomes the judicial division of rural land as determinant of the urban form.
Decreases the risk and time of the construction of low income housing for private
developers.
Prevents corruption related to housing awards by public officials.
MetroVivienda has been a success in public low income housing policy in Bogota. Since
its creation it has initiated projects with a potential for approximately 35,000 new houses.
In its first project, Ciudadela EI Recreo, there are already 4,320 houses sold benefiting
more than 21,000 persons directly.4
fM t V" d' P . tarac ens ICS 0 e ro IVieD a s r0.lec S
Project Area Low Income Benefited
Housine: Units PODulation
Ciudadela EI Reereo 115 10,500 40,950
Ciudadela EI Porvenir 132 12,500 48,750
Ciudadela Usme 65 6,000 23,400
Ciudadela Campo Verde 65 6,000 23,400
Total 377 35,000 136,500
. .
Table 1.3
Ch t' f
Source: MetroVlvlenda, 2003 .
4 MetroVivienda, Seminario de Oportunidades de Inversion en la Ciudad y en los Proyectos de
MetroVivienda, January 2003, Bogota.
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1.3 Government Subsidies
The success in the promotion of affordable housing of MetroVivienda and the new trend
of private developers towards the construction of low income housing since 2000 has
increased the pressure in other constraints in the construction of this type of
developments. Particularly, there has been a shortage of government direct subsidies to
the demand. In Colombia, the central government grants subsidies to buyers of
affordable housing of a certain amount of money that can be used to buy housing of a
specified maximum price. The main factor in order to qualify to obtain a subsidy is the
level of income of the beneficiary. Table1.4 shows the value of the subsidies per each
category according to the price of the housing unit.
. C I b' 5HIrect U SI les 0 ow ncome ouslne In o om Ja
House Price Subsidy
Colombian Pesos US Dollars Colombian Pesos US Dollars
Up to $16,600,000 Up to $5,672 $7,636,000 $2,609
From $16'600.000 From $5,672 $5,312,000 $1,815
to $33 '200.000 to $11 345
From $33,200,000 From $11,345 $3,320,000 $1,134
to $44 820 000 to $15 315
Table 1.4
D' S b 'd' t L I
Source: MetroVivienda, Bogota.
The country has two different sources of capital for subsidies. Each one covers two
different sectors of the economy. The formal sector employees are covered by subsidies
from social security funds. These funds finance themselves to contributions from
employers and withholdings from payroll of employees in the formal economy. The
second source of capital for low income housing subsidies aims to cover families in the
informal sector of the economy. The central government sets a budget annually for low
income housing subsidies, This budget is allocated to the different regions of the country
based on several factors, Table 1.5 shows the annual availability of subsidies from the
central government and the social security funds for Bogota for the last couple of years.
It is projected that 16,600 subsidies will be available for 2003. This number is
insufficient if we take into account that the goal of the city is to build 38,000 low income
5 Colombian peso exchange rate: 2,926.46 pesos per dollar, January 2003.
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housing units in order to reduce the housing deficit. In the future, the availability of
subsidies will be one of the major constraints in the development of low income housing
in Bogota if supply by the formal sector continues the trend of the last three years.
Hence, it is necessary to implement new and more efficient mechanisms for the use of the
limited resources that the government has for subsidies of low income housing.
S b ·d· ~ B t'H
Source: CAMACOL, MetroVlvlenda, 2003 .
Table 1.5
L Iow ncome OUSln~ u Sl les or ogo a
2000 2001 2002 2003p
Social Security Funds
Subsidies Available for approval 15,300 17,700 19,600 15,000
Subsidies Assigned 14,900 24,200 21,700
Subsidies not Used 2,232 3,779 4,250
Approximate Central Government
Allocation 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600
Total Subsidies Available 16,900 19,300 21,200 16,600
. .
1.4 Access to Credit of the Low Income Population
One of the big concerns that housing policy makers face nowadays in Colombia is the
limited access to credit by the informal sector of the low income population of the
country. In Colombia there is a well establish residential mortgage market with a history
of more that 30 years. The current outstanding residential mortgages are valued over
$3.7 billon dollars representing 22% of the total credit in the Colombian economy.6 In
the last couple years the development of the secondary residential mortgage market has
emerged in the country and it is expected that the economy will experience in the near
future the benefits that other economies have had with the emergence of such markets. In
2002, La Titularizadora Colombiana, a private company, issued approximately $364
million dollars of residential mortgage backed securities. Out of this value,
approximately $101 million dollars, equivalent to 28% of the issuance, were backed by
low income housing mortgages.7
6 Superintendencia Bancaria, Bogota, 2003.
7 Titularizadora Colombiana S.A., Bogota, 2003.
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Figure 1.3
Total Outstanding Residential Mortgages in Colombia
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However, access to credit is limited in general to the formal sector of the economy.
Families in the informal sector find it difficult to find financing to acquire affordable
housing. For instance, in the projects of MetroVivienda, only 8% of the buyers of new
houses belonged to the informal sector.8 Ironically, the income of these families, in many
cases, is higher than that of formal sector low income comparable families. However,
they rarely have credit history or a formal employer that will guarantee the stability
required by financial institutions to give out residential mortgages. This is an important
issue that has to be dealt with in order to improve the access of low income families to
housing.
1.5 Multifamily Low Income Rental Housing in Colombia
The previous analysis presents the magnitude of the housing problem in Colombia and
makes it evident that new approaches have to be considered to work in conjunction with
the ones that are already under way. The traditional approach to solve the housing
problem in Colombia has been to promote ownership. However, another viable
alternative, which hasn't yet been encouraged by the government, is the promotion of
multifamily low income rental housing. As seen in figure lA, in Bogota 61 % of the low
income families live in rental housing. This constitutes an important portion of the
8 MetroVivienda Staff, Bogota, 2003.
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population and as such, a policy that endeavors to promote and regulate this form of
tenure in large scale should also be addressed in the country.
Figure1.4
Housin Tenure in Bo ota of Low Income Families
3%
• Owned (Without debt)
• Rent
Owned (Paying mortgage)
Cather
Source: Economistas Urbanos Asociados Ltda. , Bogota.
The promotion of multifamily low income rental housing has several advantages over the
traditional ownership approach and combined would constitute a better and more
efficient housing policy for the country.
As analyzed in chapter four, by supporting the development of low income
multifamily rental housing, the government can promote a greater number of
affordable housing units using the same amount of money on subsidies per year based
on the new subsidies scheme proposed to implement in Colombia in this document.
Low income families need to save a down payment of at least 10% of the value of the
house in order to be eligible to buy a new home. These families spent years to be
able to save for the down payment of a house while still paying rent and in many
cases prevents them form acquiring a home. In a low income multifamily rental
development families would not need the down payment and still solve their housing
needs.
Furthermore, in a well structured multifamily low income rental housing program,
families in the informal sector of the economy, could built their credit history while
15
paying their rent so that in the future they could apply for a mortgage if they decided
to choose to buy a house.
Encouraging the development of multifamily low income rental housing as a new
alternative to reduce the housing problem in Colombia, would help to diminish this big
social problem and spur economic development through an increased in the construction
activity and the establishment of the income producing real estate as an industry in the
country.
16
CHAPTER TWO - INNOVATION IN THE FINANCING
OF REAL ESTATE IN THE UNITED STATES
Low income multifamily rental housing properties are part of the real estate industry in
the United States. Hence, it is important to understand and review the financial
mechanisms that have allowed the real estate industry to access greater and more efficient
sources of capital. The real estate industry in the United States is very mature and
nowadays relies on the capital markets for its financing needs. This has allowed for
innovation in the financing of multifamily housing and has brought several benefits to the
real estate industry. This chapter will review the major innovations in the traditional
financing needs of an income producing real estate property. In the debt markets it will
review the development of the commercial mortgage backed securities market and in the
equity market will analyze the development of the real estate investment trusts.
2.1 Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities
A typical real estate project funds its development phase through a construction loan and
then converts it into a commercial mortgage for its stabilized phase. Traditional lenders
of commercial mortgages include commercial banks, insurance companies, thrifts and
pension funds. One of the most interesting developments in the real estate industry in the
last decade has been the appearance of a secondary market for commercial mortgages
through a process called securitization. Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities
(CMBS) are issued against commercial mortgages by investment banks and other major
financial institutions. "CMBS provide a new and in some respects more efficient source
of capital for commercial real estate, and they offer investors in the bond market a variety
of new securities that can serve different types of investment needs and concems"g
The total outstanding commercial mortgages as of the first quarter of 2002 totaled $1.8
trillion. Private CMBS account for $298 billion equivalent to 17% of the market.
9 Geitner David, Miller Nonnan. "Commercial real estate analysis and investments", University of
Cincinnati, South-Western Thomson Learning, 2001.
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Additionally, there were $84 billion, equivalent to 5% of the market, held by government
sponsored agencies (GSEs), Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). In 2002, CMBS accounted
for 58% of new permanent debt issued ($66 billion of an estimated $114 billion).l0
Figure 2.1
Commercial Mortgage Market Size
Securitized -
Agency Pools
5%
Securitized -
PrilElte (CMBS)
17%
Unsecuritized
78%
Source: Federal Reserve System for IQ02. Includes multi-family mortgages.
The CMBS issuance has grown greatly over the last decade and has gained an important
role in the commercial mortgage industry. In 1990 the private CMBS annual issuance
totaled $5 billion and accounted for only 1% of the total commercial mortgage
outstanding. In 1998 CMBS annual issuance peaked and reached over 20% of the total
debt outstanding.
Figure 2.2
Historical CMBS Issuance
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Source: Lend Lease Research.
10 Source: Commercial Mortgage Alert.
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"Based on the history of mortgage securitization in the residential sector nearly two
decades earlier, it seems likely that the role of the CMBS in the commercial mortgage
industry will continue to increase in the 21 st century".!! Nowadays, CMBS is a major
source of debt financing for multifamily developments. Between 1997 and 2002
multifamily commercial mortgages have averaged 20% of the annual private CMBS
issuance.!2 Furthennore, government sponsored agencies, whose mission is to provide
funding for residential housing, have issued multifamily loan securitizations since 1985
and currently continue to be heavily involved.
CMBS securities provide claims to the cash flows of the underlying mortgages in real
estate income producing properties. Issuers of CMBS group several commercial
mortgages and create different classes of securities, known as tranches, by dividing the
loan pool and assigning each tranche different characteristics. Each tranche is assigned a
certain priority of claim of the cash flows produced by the loan pool. The claim priority
takes into account the prepayment risk and the default risk of the securities. Commercial
mortgages have prepayment protections, so the prepayment risk of CMBS securities is
mitigated by the protection of the underlying mortgages. Default risk is reduced to
certain tranches by assigning credit losses sequentially to the different tranches. These
risks are assigned to the different tranches as shown in figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3
Tical CMBS Tranchin Structure
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II GeItner David, Miller Norman.
12 Lend Lease Research. 2003.
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After the tranching is been established by the issuer, the whole loan, and specifically each
tranche, is rated by the rating agencies. Investors in the bond market acquired securities
in the different tranches of the pool with different risk and return characteristics. In
essence, the capital flows from the capital markets to the real estate investors; in return
investors in the capital markets obtain coupon payments on their securities backed by the
cash flows of the underlying income producing properties. In the middle, there are
different agents such as investment banks, rating agencies, trustees, and master and
special servicers among others, that link the capital markets to the real estate investors.
Figure 2.4
CMBS Securitization Process
Source: Real Estate Capital Markets lecture notes, Professor GeItner, MIT 2002
The bottom line is that by securitizing the loan pool using the tranching system described
above the issuer creates value out of the pool of mortgages. The value of the CMBS
issuance is greater than the market value of the underlying mortgages. Part of the reason
why this occurs "is that the greater variety of securities in the CMBS tranches may be
more useful to investors of different types than the undifferentiated whole loans".13
CMBS securities trade in an active secondary market that has emerged bringing greater
security and liquidity to buyers of new issuance. Table 2.1 compares the current spreads
of CMBS and corporate bonds over 10 year treasuries. The gap between CMBS and
13 GeItner David, Miller Norman.
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corporate bonds has narrowed over the past few years as a result of CMBS market
maturation, more liquidity in CMBS and higher default risk in the corporate bond market.
Higher~rated corporate bonds still trade at tighter spreads than CMBS. However, BBBs
and BBs are very comparable today. Most industry experts believe that spreads are more
likely to widen modestly in the near term than tighten.
Table 2.1
CMBS and Corporate Spreads
Corp. Corp.
CMBS CMBS Industrials Industrials
Over 1Q-Yr Over 10-Yr Over 10-Year Over
Treasuries Swaps Treasuries Libor
AM 84 43 83 42
M 94 53 89 48
A 104 63 106 65
BBS 173 132 160 119
BB 450 409 461 420
B 950 909 $40 799
Source: Morgan Stanley Dean WItter. Spreads as of 02/28/03.
CMBS represent a major innovation III the capital markets that benefits real estate
investors among others by reducing the costs of financing and by increasing the sources
of debt financing for real estate income producing properties.
2.2 Real Estate Investment Trusts
The equity markets for real estate have also experimented great changes and advances in
the last decade. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) represent the access of the real
estate industry to the equity capital markets. A REIT is a publicly traded company that
owns and in most cases operates income producing real estate properties such as offices,
multifamily developments, shopping centers, hotels and industrial properties. REITs are
allowed to deduct dividends paid to its shareholders from their corporate income tax.
Consequently, most REITs transfer 100% of their taxable income to their shareholders
and therefore don't owe corporate tax. Shareholders pay taxes on the dividends they
receive and on capital gains on their stock. As a regulation, REITs must distribute at
least 90% of their taxable income to their shareholders.
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REITs were created in 1960 by the US Congress in order to make investments in large
scale income producing real estate properties accessible to small investors. Historically,
real estate investments had been limited to pension funds, insurance companies and
wealthy individuals. In principle, small investors could invest in commercial real estate
through the stock markets by investing in REITs, very similar to the way that mutual
funds allow small investors to hold diversified portfolios of individual stocks. Although
REITs were created in 1960, it was not until the last decade that the REITs market place
grew substantially. There were several factors that promoted the growth of REITs during
the nineties. The real estate industry endured a depression during the early nineties as a
combined consequence of overbuilding during the eighties, the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
and the savings and loan crisis. As a result, capital sources for the real estate industry
became largely unavailable. By the time the fundamentals of the real estate industry had
recovered and that investors were again ready to invest in new properties, many private
real estate companies decided that the best and most efficient way to access capital was
through the public marketplace using REITs. As seen in figure 2.5, equity market
capitalization of publicly held REITs have increased by more than ten times from 1992 to
2002.
Figure 2.5
Equity Market Capitalization of Publicly Held REITS
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Source: National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts.
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"The REIT story is an economic success story. ... They have made accessibility to
income-producing commercial real estate a reality for all investors. And their liquidity
enables investors to buy or sell shares of diversified portfolios of properties from
shopping malls to apartment complexes." 14
Currently, there are nearly 300 REITs operating in the United States. About two thirds of
the REITs are publicly held and trade on the national stock exchanges:
New York Stock Exchange - 149 REITs
American Stock Exchange - 27 REITs
NASDAQ National Market System - 12 REITs
Table 2.2
Constituent Companies NAREIT Index (January 1,2003)
Number
of REITs Company
Equity Market Capitalization
Millions of Percent of
dollars Total
35
20
8
7
39
24
9
46,677
27,567
10,078
9,032
39,520
18,701
17,960
2,859
1~1j3'"!,
27,266
2173
12,972
7,643
5,234
7,926
5,776
7,199
5,171
2,027
162,386
28.7%
17.0%
6.2%
5.6%
24.3%
11.5%
11.1%
1.8%
18:10/.
16.8%
1.3%
8.0%
4.7%
3.2%
4.9%
3.6%
4.4%
3.2%
1.2%
100.0%
Source: National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts.
Table 2.2 presents the constituent companies of the NAREIT index as of January 2003.
NAREIT is the national trade association for real estate companies. REITs can be
14 U.S. Representative Ben Cardin (D-MD).
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classified by the property type in which they invest. REITs investing in multifamily
developments are an important portion of the REITs market. Residential REITs represent
18.1% of the equity market capitalization of the NAREIT index.
Investing in REITs
As in any other publicly held company, a measure of earnings and the projection of their
future behavior is very important to estimate a value for the company. REITs report their
financial results including net income and earnings per share like any other public
company using general accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Under GAAP
requirements, commercial property owners must depreciate the cost of their properties to
zero even though well maintained properties continue have a high value even after 20, 30
or 40 years. Thus, EPS which is the traditional GAAP measure of net income is
considered by most REITs analyst to be inappropriate to value real estate companies
since large depreciation charges tend to overstate expenses and understate earnings. In
1991, NAREIT adopted an alternative measure of earnings for REITs that does not have
this drawback. Funds from Operation (FFO) is equal to a REIT's net income, excluding
gains or losses from sales of property, and adding back real estate depreciation.
Figure 2.6
REIT FFO per Share Growth (Year over year growth by quarter)
Percent
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REITs have had an impressive record of growth in FFO over the last several years.
Figure 2.6 presents REIT's FFO per share growth year over year by quarter. Stable
growth over the years has attracted more investors into REITs. Since REITs are required
to payout 90% of its taxable income to their shareholders, returns to investors in REITs
come principally from the high dividends yields plus a moderate capital appreciation over
the long term. Figure 2.7 compares the annual returns of different investors sectors for
the period of 1975 to 2000. Over the whole period the NASDAQ Composite index had
the greatest returns. The returns during the period from 1995 to 1999 correspond to the
"internet bubble" with extraordinary and unsustainable high returns of the technology
stocks and other large cap stocks. Looking at the period from 1975 to 1994, in order to
isolate the performance over the years 1995 to 1999, it is clear that the returns on REITs
have been on average higher than other investment sectors including the large and small
stocks and the utilities sector.
Figure 2.7
Historical Performance of REITs
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However, it is important to observe that in the most recent period from 1995 to 1999 the
returns on REITs have been considerable low in comparison with all other investment
sectors but the debt market. There are several reasons why this is the case, and why in
general analysts expect that REITs will be continue to have returns between the returns of
the equity and debt markets. During this period is when the REIT market had a great
transformation from private to public ownership. This allowed the industry to gain
transparency since the decision making process of the commercial property owners and
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developers have been increasingly under the scrutiny of financial analysts, investors and
financial regulators. However, with the increase of transparency and public information
in the industry, the market has become more efficient and hence the returns that took
advantages of inefficiencies in the market had declined in recent years.
In figure 2.8, risk is presented as the standard deviation of the monthly price returns for
different investment sectors. As anticipated, investors would require a higher return on
investments with higher risks. Since the end of 1996 to 2000 the price volatility of the
NASDAQ Composite index has increased by 94%, including a 26% increase in just the
first eight months of 2000. During the same period the price volatility of the S&P 500
increased by 54%. In the meantime, the NAREIT Equity index increased just 11 %. The
low price volatility increase of REITs was due in part to the stability of the cash flows of
the properties that they owned at the time, as a consequence of the good economic
conditions of the period. "The turmoil in the equity markets has reminded investors of
the importance of including in their portfolios share of companies with predictable cash
flows, high dividends and lower multiples.,,15 Since REITs offer to their shareholders
these characteristics, investors increased their participation in the REIT market.
Figure 2.8
Five Year Rolling Standard Deviation of Monthly Price Returns
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Furthermore, investors benefit from diversification when investing in REITs since the
correlation of the return of REIT with the returns of other investment sectors is
considerably low. Figure 2.3 shows the correlation of monthly returns of equity REITs
with the returns of other market indexes. During the period of 1972 to 2000 the data
show that the REITs were less correlated with the NASDAQ 100 and most correlated
with the Russell 200 index.
Table 2.3
Correlation of Equity REIT Returns with other Investment Sectors
TJme Periods
Markel Sedor Indell 11172~.2OQO 1972·1979 1980·1989 1990-:l!OtlO 109B-1994 1995--2000
n\ ,%I (3\ (.(j (5) IS) m
Russell 2000 0.83 0,83 0.74 0.50 0.67 0.36
S&PS(]O 11-56 0.64 0.65 0.39 0.53 0.28
NASDAQ Composite 0.54 0.13 0.71 a.2Si 0.80( G,M
sap UtlHtles ('-38 0.85 O.:!8 0.33 0.29 0.37
NASDAQ 100 0,34 NA 0.68 0.23 0.57 0.01
Merrill Lynch GoII\ICOl'P G.23 0.47 0.17 0.25 0.39 0.10
Source: Ibbotson Associates National Association ofReal Estate Investment Trusts.
There is also a trend in which the correlation between the return of equity REITs and
almost all other sectors decline over time (columns 3 to 5). Besides, as shown in columns
6 and 7, the correlation even decreased in most cases during the nineties. According to
classic portfolio allocation theory, the optimal real estate share in a portfolio should be
rather large (around 40%) and stable for a broad range of relatively conservative return
targets. 16 However, actual portfolio allocations are not even close. As an example, US
pension funds allocation in real estate in the nineties averaged 4%.17 Over the last two
decades there has been an uncertainty why this is the case. But probably the actual
circumstances of the US market will help increase the real estate allocation of
institutional investors who seek the diversification benefits of REITs.
16 Geitner David, Miller Nonnan.
17 Geitner David, Miller Nonnan.
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CHAPTER THREE - FINANCING MULTIFAMILY LOW
INCOME HOUSING IN THE US
Financing multifamily rental housing is a complex process involving several stakeholders
and numerous sources of capital during the different phases of a project. Besides the
traditional debt and equity financing components of a multifamily rental project,
affordable rental housing needs the subsidy of the government in order to be financially
feasible. The federal government has supported the development of multifamily low
income rental housing through a variety of tax incentives since the 1970s. The current
scheme is referred as the Low Income Housing Tax credit (LIHTC) program. This
program will be the analysis of this chapter.
3.1 The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program
The LIHTC program was created by Congress through the Tax Reform Act of 1986. It is
the only active federal program that subsidizes the development of affordable rental
housing in the United States. Since 1993 the program has been granted permanent status
by Congress. It has been the major effort of the federal government to promote the
development of affordable rental housing. Under the LIHTC program, the federal
government gives an incentive for private investors to provide equity for the development
of low income housing by granting them tax credits. Thus, it is a supply side subsidy;
rather that giving subsidies directly to the demand, the government supports the supply of
affordable rental housing. Investors receive a dollar for dollar reduction in their federal
tax liability for a period of ten years as a result of their investment in qualified low
income rental housing projects. Projects must meet certain characteristics and must be
rented by moderate or low income families for a determined affordability lock-in period.
The program is administered by the states who receive tax credit allocations by the
federal government. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) oversees the program to ensure
that states or the investors don't use more tax credits than authorized.
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The program has been considered as the most successful policy for the promotion of low
income rental housing in the United States. It has promoted more than 1.2 million
housing units for low income families since 1987 with an average of 82,000 units per
year. The government has allocated $5.2 billion dollars worth of tax credits since the
inception of the program with an average investment per housing unit of approximately
$4,300 dollars.
T C dOtH
Table 3.1
All fL Iocatlon 0 ow ncome ouslng ax re I S
1*11,V;<';'~~lk"1'\9ilmi'" !~ l:()tat~AJJ;peated W~!i: 'till "fl'iip' dl,'" i~~i> "J I;~i 1:axGreditDoUirs"'"
ht Year (Dollars) '" TotarUoits Allocated Per Unit
1987 $62,885,954 34,491 $1,823
1988 $209,779,916 81,408 $2,577
1989 $307,182,516 126,200 $2,434
1990 $213,148,840 74,029 $2,879
1991 $400,420,875 111,970 $3,576
1992 $337,032,273 91,300 $3,691
1993 $424,701,977 103,756 $4,093
1994 $494,914,237 117,099 $4,226
1995 $420,922,941 86,343 $4,875
1996 $378,920,852 77,003 $4,921
1997 $382,894,328 70,453 $5,435
1998 $368,077,833 67,822 $5,427
1999 $374,670,775 62,240 $6,020
2000 $378,749,319 59,601 $6,355
2001 $462,426,235 67,261 $6,875
Total 55,216.728,871 1,230,97' 54,238
Average $347,781,925 82,065 $4,347
Source: Danter Company.
The program has had major improvements since it began: "More cost effective use of the
tax credit, longer affordability lock-in periods, more housing units produced per credit
dollar, more low income households been served, greater involvement of non profit
organizations, and more effective due diligence and compliance monitoring.,,18
There are several participants involved in the process of developing low income housing
projects under the LIHTC scheme. Figure 3.1 presents the main participants, their
relationships and the flow of the process which follows the following steps:
18 E&Y Kenneth Leventhal Real Estate Group. "The low-income housing tax credit: the first decade",
published for the National Council of State Housing Agencies, 1997
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1. The IRS allocates a certain amount of tax credits to State Housing Agencies per
year.
2. Developers submit low income housing rental projects for consideration of the
State Housing Agencies.
3. Qualified projects are assigned a certain amount of tax credits depending on the
characteristics of the projects.
4. Once a project has been allocated a specific amount of tax credits, developers
seek equity financing through syndicators.
5. Syndicators provide equity in exchange of future annual benefits obtained from
the housing tax credits. Syndicators are financial intermediaries that pool equity
investments from corporations or individuals and in turn transfer them the tax
benefits of diversified portfolios of several low income rental housing projects.
Figure 3.1
General Structure of the Low Income Housin2 Tax Credit Proe;ram
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3.2 The Tax Credit Allocation Process
Until 2000, each year the federal government allocated tax credits equivalent to $1.25
dollars per resident to each state. This allocation was increased in 2001 to $1.50 dollars
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per person and it was expected to be adjusted for inflation in 2003. 19 States have the
freedom to set the allocation criteria that best fit their affordable rental housing policies
within the general guidelines established by the IRS. Each state must give priority to
projects that will offer housing for the lowest income tenants and that will have the
longer affordability period. The affordability period refers to the minimum time that a
project must remain providing low income rental units. This period must be a minimum
of 30 years although it is possible to convert to market rents after IS years under certain
conditions. At the end of this period the projects remain under the control of the property
owners who have the freedom to manage them in the way they choose.
Tax credits are available to the development of new low income rental housing projects
as well as to the rehabilitation of existing projects. In order to qualify for LIHTC the
project must set aside a minimum number of low income units according to one of the
following guidelines:
At least 20% of the housing units in the project must be restricted to families whose
income is 50% or less of the area median gross income.
At least 40% of the housing units in the project must be restricted to families whose
income is 60% or less of the area median gross income.
Furthermore, the rents to low income families should not be more that 30% of a qualified
person gross income. During the affordability period, projects must be in compliance
with the percentage of low income housing approved at the beginning of the project, and
the maximum rents charged to low income households in those units. Projects that don't
meet their affordability requirements are subject to credit recapture. In this case,
investors in the property lose their tax benefit and are also subject to a penalty depending
upon the infraction.
The value of the housing credits allocated to a project depends on its development costs
and the percentage of low income housing units in the project. For new developments,
19 Danter Company, 2001.
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the eligible basis for tax credit allocation is equal to the total development costs minus
land, working capital and other intangible costs. For rehabilitation of existing projects
the eligible basis is equal to the sum of the acquisition costs, additions, and
improvements. The eligible basis is then multiplied by the percentage of low income
housing units in the project. This amount is known as the qualified basis of the
development and it may change over the years as the qualified occupancy varies with the
number of qualified tenants.
Finally, the qualified basis is multiplied by the applicable tax credit rate to arrive at the
annual low income housing tax credit. There are two different tax credit rates that
depend on the financing of the project:
The 4% tax credit rate is granted to projects that have additional federal subsidies in
their financing such as tax exempt bonds or loans from the US Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
The 9% tax credit rate is granted to projects that are financed without additional
federal subsidies.
oca Ion 0 ax re I S oa rOlec
Total Development Costs $4,200,000
Less land, working capital and other intangible costs $380,000
Eligible Basis $3,820,000
% of Affordable Housing Units 70%
Qualified Basis $2,674,000
Annual Tax Credit Rate 9%
Annual Tax Credits $240,660
Period of the Credits (years) 10
Total Low Income Housing Credits $2,406,600
Table 3.2
All t· fTC d·t t P . t
The exact credit rates are calculated by the Treasury Department and change each month
with the movements of the interest rates. The housing tax credits calculated this way are
available to claim by equity investors for a period of 10 years beginning at the moment
that a low income household occupies a unit in the project. Table 3.2 illustrates the
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process of tax credit allocation for a project with 70% of affordable housing units and a
tax credit rate of 9%.
3.3 The Developer's Perspective
The development of projects under the LIHTC program is very different from market rate
rental housing developments. Developers of affordable rental housing projects must be
willing to take additional risks due to the increased complexity in the process.
Developers have to look for multiple and unconventional sources of funding, ensure the
compliance of the requirements of the LIHTC program, and obtain several approvals
during a process that could take several years. The role of the developer has been very
important in the success of a program. During the initial years, there was a lack
understanding of the rules and procedures from developers that led to a low allocation of
available tax credits funds. However, once the process became more familiar to the
developers and all the participants in the system, the situation changed dramatically. In
1995 only 35% of the applicants were awarded tax credits for a value of $420.9 million
dollars.2° The increased demand for credits have brought new efficiencies and increased
the competition among developers for the allocation of tax credits. This has meant,
among others, a decrease in the development fees as seen in figure 3.2
Figure 3.2
Develo ment Fees as a Percenta
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In 1992 the development fees were 12.5% of the adjusted development costs (total
development cost minus land, working capital and other intangible costs). By 1994,
development fees have come down to 10.8% as a result of increased competition among
developers and the presence of more sophisticated equity capital investors from the
capital markets that required the process to become more efficient.
The first step in the development process is the assessment of the feasibility of a
particular site for low income rental housing. During this process the developer estimates
the construction budget, analyses possible financing alternatives and different project
configurations of affordable and rental unit mixes, and estimates the probability of
government approval and tax credit allocation. Once the developer decides to continue
with a project, the second step is to gain control of the site through the purchase of an
option or an outright purchase of the land. The Developer then applies to the State
Housing Agency for a reservation of housing credits based on the estimated
developments costs. The developer must also obtain all the necessary government
approvals for the project including access to utilities, environmental reviews, building
permits, zoning rights, etc. Simultaneously, developers must find commitments for the
construction loan and for the permanent mortgage. Once the state has granted the project
tax credits, the developer then must find equity investors. This process is done normally
through syndicators that pool equity investments in funds designed to invest in low
income housing projects. Finally, when the equity is secured, developers are able to
close the construction loan and begin construction. Once the project is completed, states
agencies ensure that the project meets the program requirements and based on the final
development cost the allocation of tax credits is adjusted and the period of ten years of
tax credits to the equity investor begins.
3.4 The Syndication Process
Syndicators are financial intermediaries that pool several low income rental housing
projects into one tax credit equity fund and then securitize the tax credits for sale to
investors. In doing so, syndicators add value to the system by taking advantage of
economies of scale reducing transaction costs per project, offering developers a wider
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base of equity investors, and by offering investors with a diversified portfolio of projects
that in turn reduce the risk of investing in low income rental housing properties. The
typical services of a syndicator of housing tax credits include:
Organization of the investment vehicle including the structure of the financial
arrangements and the legal documents.
Underwriting and selection of the low income rental housing projects that will
constitute the fund.
• Education of the possible equity investor in relation with the benefits and the possible
risks of investing in the low income housing tax credits.
Negotiation of the price of the credits with the developers. Due to the increased
competition for the tax credits, syndicators have to compete in the price they offer to
developers introducing efficiency in the market.
Negotiation of performance guarantees from the sponsor reducing the risk for the
investors.
Monitoring of the development in the construction phase.
During the operation of the property they provide asset management.
Recently, large syndicators have been able to provide liquidity to investors due to the
large volume of business. Although housing credits can't be traded as commodities in
the open market, syndicators have been able to create a secondary market in which
investors sale their participations in the tax credit equity funds. Even though these
secondary markets are very thin, there is a possible exit for an investor.
There are three categories of syndicators:
For-profit syndicators: Companies established to sponsor large tax credit equity
funds that invest in diversified portfolios throughout the country.
Non-profit syndicators: States have developed non-profit funds that invest
exclusively in that state's low income projects. There are also national non-profit
funds that diversified their portfolios with properties around the country.
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Direct Corporate investors: Direct corporate investors have been led by institutions
like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Due to the large requirements of housing tax
credits of these institutions, they can eliminate the intermediaries by investing directly
in low income rental housing properties.
The compensation of for-profit syndicators has been in the form of an upfront load to the
equity investors. This load is used to cover for syndicator expenses, fees, and to fund the
reserves of the housing tax credit funds. The value of the loads have tightened due to the
increase competition for housing tax credits and recent values have been around 15% of
the equity raised by investors.
Figure 3.3
Structure of the S ndication Investment Vehicle
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Source: E&Y Kenneth Leventhal Real Estate Group.
The structure of a typical syndication investment vehicle is shown in figure 3.3. It has
the configuration of a two-tier entity. Usually, a syndicator forms a limited investment
partnership and becomes its general partner. Then, it sells participations on this
partnership, known as the housing credit fund, to tax credit equity investors that usually
are large corporations. This partnership then becomes a limited partner in several limited
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operating partnerships that own low income rental housing properties. The developer of
each property is the general partner of the operating partnerships.
This structure has several benefits which limit the exposure of investors to the
construction and operational risks of individual properties since it diversifies among
several projects. Additionally it has positive incentives in the performance of the
different parties involved in the process. Since the structure places large institutional
investors directly in the line of accountability for the property's financial results, it leads
them to enforce good performance on developers and syndicators. Investors choose
syndicators by the long term rate of returns of their funds, and syndicators select
properties and developers for their ability to carry out successful projects than in tum will
deliver stable housing tax credits over the life or the project.
3.5 The Equity Market for LIHTC
Since the beginning of the LIHTC program in 1986, the type of equity investors has
changed over the years. During the first years, individual investors were the main source
of equity. Since 1990, corporate investors have increased their participation in the
LIHTC program and nowadays they dominate the market. Types of corporations
involved in the LIHTC equity market represent a wide variety of sectors in the economy:
banks and financial services companies, insurance companies, manufacturers, utilities,
consumer services companies, and quasi governmental companies such as Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.
The entrance of sophisticated institutional investors to the market has increased the
competition for housing tax credits and improved the overall efficiency of the program.
The amount of equity that can be generated through the LIHTC program is directly
related to the rate of return that investors demand. In turn, these rates are a function
mainly of the level of risk that the investors perceive in the LIHTC investment and their
particular condition as tax payers (individuals versus corporations). The stream of tax
benefits over the 10 year period is discounted at the investor's required rate of return in
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order to calculate the net present value of equity raised by the housing tax credits. While
in 1987, one dollar of housing tax credit raised $0.42 dollars of equity; in 1997 the same
dollar of housing tax credits generated $0.71 dollars of equity, and by 2001 this amount
had risen to approximately $0.80 dollars.21 This has meant that the returns that investors
perceive have decrease accordingly. Figure 3.4 presents the evolution of the rate of
returns for investors in the housing credit program.
Figure 3.4
Changes in Investor Rates of Return
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While in 1990 investors were expecting rates of return around 17%, by 1997 their
required rates of returns have decreased to around 11 %. Nowadays, these returns have
dropped even further to approximately 7.5%. While recent yields are a reflection of the
current low interest rates in the United States, over the existence of the LIHTC program,
there has been a clear trend of reduced required rate of returns by investors in low income
housing tax credits. This trend is attributable to the following factors among others:
The initial years of the program were characterized by a lack of understanding by the
investors, uncertainty in the stability of the program, and lack of a reliable history of
performance in housing tax credit investments. This situation led investors to apply a
21 Millenial Housing Commission, Tax Policy Focus Meeting May, 2001.
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premium on the rates of return they were expecting from this type of investments in
order to account for the perceived additional risk.
In 1993, with the permanent status granted to the program by the Congress, investors
realized that they could rely in the LIHTC program for their long term planning.
Hence, their perception of risk from the stability of the program was reduced.
The success in the performance of the first investments in tax credits attracted several
new investors. Increased competition for the limited amount of credits per year, led
to a decrease in the required rate of return by investors.
3.6 Risks
Equity investors in the LIHTC program are essentially investing in real estate income
producing properties. As such, the risk in these investments should be comparable to
investing in REITs which carry considerable risk as described in chapter two. However,
the syndication process allows to diversify the traditional real estate risks among several
properties with different developers and managers, which in turn reduces the overall risk.
On the other hand, there are specific risks associated to this type of investments mainly in
relation to the compliance with the affordability requirements of the program. In general,
the risks of an investment in the LIHTC program can be divided in the following
categories:
Development Risk
The most significant risks of a real estate project are in the phase of the construction and
the lease up periods of the property. During the construction period it is essential to build
the project on budget and on time. Any cost overruns or delays would go against the
profitability of the investment. The lease up period is also very important since the faster
the property begins to generate revenue, the better the returns on the investment.
Furthermore, in the case of the low income rental housing properties, the tax benefits
can't be claimed until the affordable units are occupied by qualified residents.
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Investors in low income housing tax credits are protected to a certain extent from these
risks through several mechanism used by the syndicators. Syndicators carefully select
developers with a track record of success, strong construction expertise, and financial
strength. Developers are required to obtain completion guarantees that cover termination
upon budget and schedule. Furthermore, syndicators offer investors diversification
between several projects with different developers.
Market Risk
The commercial success of a project depends on the acceptance of the product by the
future tenants of the housing units. Local markets determine the characteristics of a
specific project and vary widely depending on the location of the project. Developers are
supposed to have local expertise and understand the needs of the local markets. Their
appreciations are checked several times in the LIHTC process: during the underwriting of
the project by State Housing Agencies for allocation of housing tax credits, during the
mortgage lender underwriting, and finally during the syndicator's underwriting. The
projects commercial success will determine its ability to generate revenue over the years
and be able to pay its debt obligations and recover the costs of its development.
Management Risk
Every real estate project has management risks associated with the day to day operations
of the property. Property managers have the responsibility of collecting the rents on time,
keeping the expenses under budget, and ensure that the maintenance of the property is not
deferred. Affordable housing poses more pressures under management since they serve
special populations that require additional social services. Syndicators place an
additional layer of control on properties to ensure that they are well maintained so that
the tax benefits will flow to housing tax credit investors over time.
40
Compliance Risk
Affordable housing developed under the LIHTC program also has the risk associated
with the compliance of the regulations of the program. Specifically, properties must keep
the proportion of low income tenants that was agreed upon the allocation of the tax
credits during the affordability period. Investors bear the risk of recapture of tax credits
in case properties don't meet the minimum requirements at any point in time.
3.7 Findings
The low Income Housing Tax Credit program has been a success affordable housing
policy serving the target population and the originally intended by legislators.
The LIHTC program has become more cost effective over the years.
The program has been able to successfully bring together private equity investors,
lenders, private developers and state agencies in order to produce affordable rental
housing.
This cooperation has allowed the government to leverage its subsidies in order to
promote a greater number of low income rental housing units.
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CHAPTER FOUR - ASSESSING THE FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY OF
MULTIFAMILY RENTAL HOUSING IN BOGOTA, COLOMBIA
Currently, the government of Colombia doesn't subsidize the development of affordable
rental housing. Consequently, there is no formal offer of low income rental housing in
developments of considerable size, and low income households have met their rental
housing needs through small landlords many cases under improper conditions. Taking
into account that the development of low income rental housing properties is not
economically viable without government subsidies, this chapter evaluates the
government's level of support needed in order to tum this activity attractive for private
investors. The analysis is focused in the current conditions of Bogota. The model
applied is an adaptation of the main concepts of the LIHTC program used in the United
States to support the development of affordable rental housing.
The analysis finds that with the current budget allocated to ownership housing subsidies
in the country, the government could promote around 2.4 more rental housing units. A
combination of rental and ownership subsidies is viable; it would better serve the housing
needs of low income households and it would constitute a more comprehensive housing
policy in the country.
4.1 Target Households and Maximum Rent
The target households constitute 80% of the population of Bogota with monthly average
income between two and four monthly minimum wages. As seen in table 4.1, these
households' current average rent payments range between $180 and $260 thousand pesos
per month.22 This expense is equivalent to a very high percentage of their monthly
income ranging from 23% to 36%. Accordingly, a target of $180 thousand pesos per
month in rent payments per household has been set for the base scenario of this analysis.
22 Average rent payments range between $62 and $89 dollars per month. All conversions to dollars in this
chapter will be calculated using the following exchange rate: 2,926.46 pesos per dollar, January 2003.
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Table 4.1
Housing Expense as a Proportion of Income (Figures in Thousands of pesos)
MontWy Minumun Wage per Home
1 2 3 4
MontWy Average Income 286 500.8 766 1070
MontWy Rent Expense 149 178 206 256
% ofIncome 52.2% 35.5% 26.9% 23.9%
MontWy Mortgage Payment 143 191 225 347
% of Income 50.0% 38.1% 29.3% 32.4%
Source: Economistas Urbanos Asociados Ltda. , Bogota.
The financial models described below, assume that the owners of low income rental
housing in Bogota will be able to increase the rents per year according to inflation. This
is a reasonable assumption based on the data observed in the increase of rents in the
country. Figure 4.1 compares the inflation index with the housing rent index In
Colombia. In average, during the last decade rents have kept pace with inflation.
Figure 4.1
Inflation Index vs. Housin Rent Index in Colombia
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Source: DANE, Bogota, 2003.
4.2 Characteristics and Costs of a Typical Affordable Housing Development
Even though there are several types of low income housing units with different prices
offered in the market in Bogota, this analysis is focused on housing units under
approximately $21 million pesos ($7,175 dollars). This is the current price limit imposed
by the city government to housing units in projects developed by MetroVivienda, which
aim to serve the lowest income households in the city. Six low income housing projects
with over 1,400 units were analyzed in order to obtain the typical characteristics and
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costs in the current market for this type of development in Bogota. Table 4.2 presents the
area per house and the number of housing units per project. According to these figures,
an average of 40 square meters of built area per house, and 240 units per project is used
in this analysis.
yplca reas an ensltles 0 or a e ouslng
Developer
Area per No. of Units per
Housing Unit rm2) Development
Parques de Potosi 37.0 244
Fundacion Compartir 44.7 224
Cusezar 46.6 246
Marva! 44.8 238
Disefio Urbano 38.9 240
UT Cerezos 32.0 250
Average 40.7 240
..
Table 4.2
Ciudadela EI Recreo, MetroVivienda, Bogota
T . I AdD f Affi d bl H
Source: MetroV1Vlenda, Bogota, 2003.
The costs of a typical low income housing development in Bogota were derived from
figures supplied by MetroVivienda. These figures are based on the six projects analyzed
in the sample and on the pricing techniques that MetroVivienda employs for the sale of
the urbanized land designated to the development of low income housing units in its first
project, Ciudadela EI Recreo. Table 4.3 presents the current typical costs of a
development of affordable housing in Bogota. Urbanized land represents 20.4% of sales,
Construction Cost 58.4%, and indirect costs 13.2%. Indirect costs include design and
technical studies, utility connection, developer's fee, construction fee, sale expenses,
taxes, legal expenses, post-sale repairs, and finance costs. The profit margin for the
developer is usually around 80/0, which combined with the management fee of 2.6% adds
to a total of 10.6% of the project sales.
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Table 4.3
Ciudadela EI Recreo, MetroVivienda, Bogota
T I Affi d bl H P t Dint Costs• I •
- COSIS
TotalDc\ ('Iopment Costs Per (I nit
°/0IrE'1
'Iillious of ill'SOS ( S I>ollars 'Iillions of I)esos ('S Dollars2003 2003
SALES 4,994 1,706,455 20.8 7,110 100.0%
COSTS
Urbanized Land 1,021 348,886 4.25 1,454 20.4%
Direct Costs 2,914 995,770 12.14 4,149 58.4%
Interior Urbanism 154 52,651 0.64 219 3.1%
Construction 2,760 943,119 11.50 3,930 55.3%
Indirect Costs 661 225,846 2.75 941 13.2%
Design and Technical Studies 41 14,040 0.17 59 0.8%
Utility connection 36 12,285 0.15 51 0.7%
Developers Fee (Project Management) 128 43,876 0.54 183 2.6%
Construction fee 204 69,704 0.85 290 4.1%
Sales 48 16,504 0.20 69 1.0%
Taxes 22 7,427 0.09 31 0.4%
Legal expenses 36 12,378 0.15 52 0.7%
Pastsale repairs 26 8,775 0.11 37 0.5%
Finance Costs 120 40,857 0.50 170 2.4%
TOTAL COSTS 4,596 1,570,501 19.15 6,544 92.0%
PROFIT MARGIN 398 135,953 1.66 566 8.0%
Source: MetroVlVlenda, Bogota, 2003.
4.3 Description of the Process
There are several variables and alternatives involved in the process in order to determine
the subsidy required to tum the development of low income rental housing attractive to
private investors. The process followed in this analysis can be described in the following
steps:
1. Determine the total rental income per year that a property can generate given the
maximum rent that the target low income households can afford, and the number
of housing units that a typical affordable housing development has.
2. Calculate the value of the income producing property. This value is a function of
the rent it produces, the typical expenses and maintenance of an income
producing property, and the required rate of the return for the real estate investor.
3. Determine the amount of tax credit equity required to cover the difference
between the market value of the property and the value determined in the step
above. The market value is equivalent to the price obtained as if the housing units
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were sold in the market instead of rented. It should cover the construction costs
and the required profit margins for the developer during the construction phase.
4. Estimate the value of the annual subsidy per unit given the required rate of return
of the equity investors and an estimation of the syndication costs.
5. Once a value for the subsidy has been established the model must be tested under
several scenarios. A sensitivity analysis of several variables must be perfonned in
order to better understand the results obtained with the model.
4.4 Financial Model
Stabilized Phase
Exhibit 4.1 presents the base scenario of the projected net operating income and cash
flow to equity for the real estate investor in the stabilized phase of the project. In this
section there is a description of the each of the assumptions and the results obtained in the
projected cash flows. Typically, the cash flows of an income producing property are
projected for 10 years which is a reasonable long period of time. This is because most
properties are expected to have long lives and most investors hold properties for long
periods of time. Figures in the financial model are in constant pesos of2003.
Rental Income: It has been estimated that the rental income of a typical low income
rental housing property will be $518 million pesos ($1 77,005 dollars) per year with an
average rent per house of $180 thousand pesos ($62 dollars) per month and a total of 240
units per development. The rents are supposed to keep the pace of inflation during the
period of analysis.
General Vacancy: It is not realistic to expect that a property will be fully occupied during
the whole year. Hence, it will not be able to generate all of its income potential. To
account for this, a vacancy factor of 5% per year has been applied in order to compute the
effective gross income of the property. For the first year, a factor of 30% has been
applied in order to account for the lease up period of the property. As a reSUlt, the
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effective gross income of a typical low income rental housing property in Bogota is
expected to be $363 million pesos ($124,041 doBars) for the first year and $492 million
pesos ($168,121 dollars) thereafter.
Operating Expenses: This category of expenses refers to a number of regular costs
related to the ongoing operation of the property. The typical major expenses of an
income producing property considered in this analysis were property management fees,
real estate taxes, operation and maintenance, and leasing commissions. As it is
customary in the rental market in Bogota, the utilities expense is covered directly by the
tenant. Management fees account for the administration of the property and were
calculated as 7% of the effective gross income. Real Estate taxes were calculated as
0.7% of the value of the property. Operation and maintenance costs represent periodic
minor expenses related to the preservation of the asset in good condition. They were
calculated as 5% of the operating gross income. The expense of leasing commissions
was estimated based on a period per lease of one year and a 2% commission on new
leases. Operating expenses account in total to $87 million pesos ($29,729 dollars) per
year equivalent to 18% of the effective gross income of the property.
Net Operating Income (NOI): It results from the subtraction of the operating expenses
from the effective gross income. NOI is the most widely indicator of the profit
generation ability of a property in the real estate industry. According to the results of the
base scenario of this analysis, the NOI of a typical affordable housing property in Bogota
would be $405 million pesos ($138,392 dollars).
Capital Expenditures: This item refers to major expenditures providing long term
improvements to the physical quality of the property required to maintain its value.
Examples include replacing a roof, painting of facades, repaving a parking lot, etc.
Capital expenditures were estimated as 200/0 of the effective gross income per year for an
equivalent of $100 million pesos ($34,171 dollars).
47
Building Disposition: For the purpose of the analysis, it is supposed that the property is
sold in year ten. The disposition value was estimated by using a constant perpetuity on
the NOr of the building minus capital expenditures, and a discount rate of 12%.
Transaction costs of 2% of the sale value were estimated at the time of the sale.
Discount Rate: "The discount rate is meant to be the opportunity cost of capital for the
subject investment. It is the return investors could typically expect to earn (on average)
in other investments of similar risk to the subject investment.,,23 Since the income
producing real estate industry is practically non existent in the country; there aren't good
comparable investments to low income rental housing developments in Colombia. Hence
it is difficult to establish an appropriate value for the discount rate required for future real
estate investors in this type of properties. According to interviews with developers of
low income housing in Bogota, it was established that for long tenn real estate
investments, a required discount rate would be around 12%. As seen in the sensitivity
analysis section below, this variable has a great impact on the value of the subsidy
required to tum the development of low income housing attractive to private investors.
Value of the Stabilized Property: Applying a discount rate of 12% to the property before
tax cash flow of exhibit 4.1, a net present value of $2,415 million pesos ($825,211
dollars) is found for the stabilized property.
Debt Service Payment: The amount of the permanent mortgage in the stabilized property
was estimated as 700/0 of the value of the property calculated above, with a value of
$1,690 million pesos ($577,490 dollars). The pennanent loan interest rate was estimated
as 10% considering interest rates in current residential low income housing mortgages.
Levered Equity Cash Flow: The internal rate of return on the levered equity is found to
be 16.2% due to the positive leverage in the financing of a typical project. There will be
a description of the sensitivity of this variable to changes in the interest rate of the
pennanent mortgage of the property in the sensitivity analysis section below.
23 Geitner David, Miller Norman.
48
Construction Phase
Exhibit 4.2 presents the cash flow for a developer of a typical affordable rental housing
project during the construction phase. This portion of the project has an average duration
of 12 months. Usually, a developer finances it with a construction loan of about 70% of
the direct costs. Current interest rates for this type of loans in Colombia are around 12%;
hence, the financing costs during this period amount to $120 million pesos ($41,005
dollars). Commonly, once the project is finished, the construction loan is paid and a
pennanent loan with lower interest rates is obtained. Higher interest rates during the
construction phase reflect that it is the most risky period of a development.
The commercial value of the typical affordable housing project in this analysis is $4,994
million pesos ($1,706,45 5 dollars). This value allows the developer to cover for
construction costs and perceive a profit margin of 8%. Since the value of the stabilized
property is only $2,415 million pesos ($825,211 dollars), the difference of $2,579 million
pesos ($881,244 dollars) is equal to the required tax credit equity.
Low Income Housing Tax Credits Investment
Once the tax credit equity necessary to support a low income rental housing development
has been established, the next step is to determine the required annual subsidy in order to
raise it in the capital markets. Exhibit 4.3 presents the cash flow to the equity investor in
low income housing tax credits. The syndication load is assumed to be 15% of the equity
raised as it has been in the United States during the last years. In order to transfer $2,579
million pesos ($881,244 dollars) of tax credit equity to an affordable rental housing
development, $3,034 million pesos ($1,036,758 dollars) need to be raised in the capital
markets. The difference, $455 million pesos ($155,514 dollars) is equivalent to the
syndication load representing the financial intermediary costs.
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Several required rates of return to equity investors ranging from 12% to 14% have been
analyzed. As seen in the sensitivity analysis below, this variable is very important in
detennining the necessary annual subsidy per house.
The tax credit equity investment will be amortized with constant annual tax credits
offered to an investor over a period of ten years. As an example, with a 12% required
rate of return the annual tax credit offered to an investor must equal to $537 million pesos
($183,498 dollars) per year. This is equivalent to an annual subsidy per house of $2.24
million pesos ($765 dollars). If we compare this subsidy to the one offered currently to
the ownership of housing of similar characteristics, we find that the government could
promote around 2.4 more rental housing units with the same amount of money per year.
However, the total investment per house will be greater over the ten year period. In a
sense the government is leveraging itself with the private equity raised through the
offering of tax credits. As discussed before a combination of rental and ownership
subsidies is viable and would better serve the housing needs of low income households in
the country.
As seen in exhibit 4.3, the annual subsidy per house ranges from $2.24 million pesos
($765 dollars) to $2.42 million pesos ($827 dollars) according to the required rate of
return of the equity investor (120/0 and 14% respectively).
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Exhibit 4.1
TYPICAL LOW INCOME HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTED NET OPERATING INCOME AND CASH FLOW TO EQUITY
STABILIZED PHASE
(F igu res in Mi II io ns of Pesos 2(03)
Number 01 Units
Monthly' Rent per unit
Vacancv Raie
24J
0.100
5%
Debt
Loan to Value ratio
Debt Service COIIerage Ratio
Permanent FinancinQ Interest Raie
1.000
70%
1.81
10.0%
hearne
Rental Incom e 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 518
Ge ner al Va can cy (1ffi) (26) (26) (26) (26) (26) (26) (26) (26) (26)
Bfedive Gross Income 333 492 492 492 492 492 492 492 492 492
VI Q;lerati ng E~enses
......
Management Fees (36) (36) (36) (36) (36) (36) (36) (36) (36) (36)
Rea I Estate Tax (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17)
Operation and Maintenance (24) (24) (24) (24) (24) (24) (24) (24) (24) (24)
Leasing Commissions (7) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10)
Total Operating E~enses (84) (87) (87) (87) (87) (87) (87) (87) (87) (87)
Net Q;lerating Income 279 40S 40S 405 405 40S 40S 40S 405 405
Capital Expenditures (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
Building Disposition
Transaction Costs
2,544
(51)
Property Beore Tax Cash Flow 179 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 2,799
Discount Rate 12%
NPV (2004 - 2013) 2,415
Debt Service (Permanent Loan) (100) (169) (169) (169) (100) (100) (169) (169) (169) (100)
(1.600)
Debt Cas h Flow (Permanent Loan) 10.0% 1,000 (100) (169) (169) (169) (100) (100) (169) (169) (169) (1.800)
Levered Equity Cash Flow 16.2% (724) 1) 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 939
Exhibit 4.2
CASH FLOWFOR A TYPICAL LOWINCOME HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
CONSTRUCTION PHASE
Mark et pric e per Hous e 21.4 Area per house [m2] 4)
PlotArea [m2] 928) Direct Cost [Thousands/m2] 288
Nurn ber of hous ing un its 24J Constru ction Loan Inte rest (AP R) 12%
Figures in Milian of Pesos 2003
#rt:~ .3%1f0E:}Y Itfonth
2 3 4 '5 :'1 6 1 8 9
CDSTS
tktJaflized umd (1.021) (1.021)
Direct Costs
Interior urbanism (154) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17)
Constructbn (2.700) (307) (3J7) (307) (307) (307) (307) (307) (307) (3J7)
Tctal [);rect Costs (2.914) (324) (324) (324) (324) (324) (324) (324) (324) (324)
VI Indirect Costs
tv Design an"d Techn ical Stud ies (41) (41)
Utility connection (33) (~
Constru ction mana gem ent (128) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11)
Constru ction fee (204) (23) (23) (23) (23) (23) (23) (23) (23) (23)
Sale (~) (~
Taxes (22) (22)
Leg al~ ens es (33) (~
Posts ale re pairs (26) (26)
Tctallndirect Costs (541) ('52) (11) (33) (3~ (33) (~ (3~ (33) (3~ (33) (3~ (179)
TOTAL COSTS (4,476) (1P73) (11) (357) (~7) (~7) (357) (~7) (357) (~7) (357) (~7f (179)
QJmulati'ie (1,073) (1,083) (1,441 ) (1,798) (2,150) (2,512) (2,869) (3,226) (3,584) (3,941 ) (4,298) (4,476)
FINANCING
Constru ction Loan 2.0'10 ZZl ZZl ZZl ZZl 227 ZZl 227 ZZl ZZl
Loan Repayment (Includes Interest) (2.15)) (2,15))
Pr operty Sale 2,415 2,415
T~ Credit Eguio/ 2.579 :m :m 368 :m 368 :m :m
Oeve! cpment Phase Cash Flow 398 (1,073) (11 ) (131) (131) 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 77
Cumulati\e (1,073) (1P83) (1,214) (1,344) (1,107) (839) (631) (393) (1f6) 83 321 398
PnnuallRR 60.OYD
Profit Margin 8.OYD
Exhibit 4.3
LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS INVESTMENT
CASH FLOWTO EQUITY INVESTOR
Fi gures in Mi Ilion of Pesos 2003
TCD< Credit EQuity -2p79 -2,579
Syn dication L..o ad -465 -465
Tax Credit 5.370 537 537 537 537 537 537 537 537 537 537
Cash Flowto Equity In...est or 2,333 -3,034 537 537 537 537 537 537 537 537 537 537
Cumulative -3,034 -2,<=Il7 -1,000 -1,423 -800 -3<=1l 188 725 1,262 1,7r1d 2,333
IIRR 12%1
2.24
2.37
VI Tax Credit 5,591 559 559 559 559 559 559 559 559 559 559w
Cash Flowto Equity In...est or 2257 -3,034 559 559 559 559 559 559 559 559 559 559
Cumulative -3,034 -2,475 -1,916 -1,357 -7'Jl -238 321 880 1,om 1,993 2p57
IIRR 13%1
2.33
2.28
Tax Credit 5,817 EB2 EB2 EB2 EB2 582 EB2 EB2 EB2 EB2 582
Cash Flowto Equity In...est or 2,783 -3,034 EB2 EB2 EB2 EB2 582 EB2 EB2 EB2 EB2 582
Cumulative -3,034 -2,452 -1,871 -1,2&1 -707 -126 456 1,038 1,619 2,201 2,783
IIRR 14%1
I
2.42
2.19
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
The purpose of the sensitivity analysis is to understand the variability in the outcome of
the model to changes in key input variables. While there are several variables that will
change the results of the model, it is important to select the most relevant inputs that
influence the determination of the required subsidy to turn the development of low
income rental housing attractive to private investors. Four variables have been identified
for the sensitivity analysis: the monthly rent per household, the required rate of return of
the tax credit equity investor, the long term required rate of return of the real estate
investor in the income producing property, and the interest rate of the permanent
mortgage of the property.
Several scenarios with monthly rent per household varying from $170 thousand pesos
($58 dollars) to $200 thousand pesos ($68 dollars) have been run. Figure 4.2 shows the
sensitivity of the annual subsidy per house to the required rate of return of the tax credit
equity investor for four different levels of monthly rent. For a same level of rent, an
increase of 100 basis points in the required rate of return by the tax equity investor will
increase the annual subsidy per house by $90 thousand pesos ($31 dollars) in average.
Figure 4.2
Sensitivity Analysis
Annual Subsid er House vs. E ui Tax Credit Investor IRR
14.5%14.0%13.5%13.0%12.5%12.0%
2.70 "T""=".""""....",."...,,,,,,..,..,,..,.....,,,,,,,....,,.............-...,.,,,..,..,-_,.,,,,,__,..,,..,,,,,-......,............,-.,,,......__.........,......,..,,
2.60
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~ ~ 2.20 +---------------~=__.....I:!f:::::.;;;,;.--~---1
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11.5%
Equity Tax Credit Investor's IRR
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___ Monthly R~nt ptr Houn: $190
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Monthly rents in thousands of pesos.
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For a same required rate of return by the tax equity investor, a decrease in $10 thousand
pesos ($3.4 dollars) in the monthly rent per house would increase the annual subsidy per
house by $185 thousand pesos ($63 dollars) in average. Subsidies (Tax credit allocations
to projects) could vary depending on the level of rent that a project offers to qualified low
income tenants. Probably, the return offered to equity investors should be higher during
the first years of the program as an incentive to the first investors. Over time, once the
program has been proven and a track record of the performance of housing tax credit
investments have been obtained, investors will require lower rates of return reducing the
required government subsidy.
The long term required rate of return of the real estate investor in the income producing
property has first an effect on the value of the stabilized property and then an incidence in
the annual subsidy per house required to turn profitable the investment in such property.
Figure 4.3 presents the sensitivity of the value of the underlying stabilized property to
changes in the required rate of return of the real estate investor for four levels of monthly
rent per household. For a same level of rent, an increase in the required rate of return of
the real estate investor of 100 basis points will decrease the value of the property by 8%
III average.
Figure 4.3
Sensitivity Analysis
Stabilized Pro er Value vs. Real Estate Investor Discount Rate
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The decrease in the value of the stabilized property will increase the need for tax credit
equity, which in turn will increase the need for a larger subsidy per house. Figure 4.4
presents the incidence of a change in the required rate of return of the real estate investor
on the annual subsidy per household for a constant 12% internal rate of return in the tax
credit equity investment. For a same level of rent, an increase of 100 basis points in the
required rate of return of the real estate investor will increase the annual subsidy per
house by $185 thousand pesos ($63 dollars) on average. This change is twice as much as
the same change in the required rate of return of the tax credit equity investor. For the
base scenario, with a rent per month of $180 pesos per house ($62 dollars), the subsidies
range from $1.83 million pesos ($625 dollars) to $2.53 million pesos ($865 dollars) per
house according to the required rate of return of the real estate investor (10% and 14%
respectively).
Figure 4.4
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Real estate investors often focus on the levered Internal Rate of Return (lRR) on
investment, which depends on the amount of positive leverage in the financing of the
project. The greater the difference between the unlevered rate of return of a property and
the interest rate in the permanent mortgage, the greater the positive leverage in a project.
Figure 4.5 presents the sensitivity of the levered IRR for the real estate investor to
changes in the interest rate on the permanent mortgage, for four unlevered required rates
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of return for the real estate investor. In average, given the leverage ratio of 70% on a
typical project, the unlevered IRR increases by 105 basis points when the interest rate on
the permanent mortgage decreases by 50 basis points. For the base scenario in this
analysis, the unlevered return on equity to the real estate investor is expected to be
16.2%.
Figure 4.5
Sensitivity Analysis
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CHAPTER FIVE - LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS
FOR OWNERSHIP HOUSING IN COLOMBIA
Although this thesis is about financing low income rental housing, it is evident that with
some alterations, the LIHTC program could also be used to subsidy the ownership of low
income housing in Colombia. Therefore, this chapter will lay out those basic adjustments
to the LIHTC program. It proposes a new scheme of subsidies in the country. There are
many advantages of using a tax credit program in order to subsidize the ownership of low
income housing:
With the same amount of money per year, the government could promote around five
times more low income housing units in the country per year.
Government would lever private capital to develop low income housing.
Despite the need for more subsidies in the country, there has been very little support
for additional direct spending in the past.
It will have additional effects in the community by raising the social awareness and
the involvement of the corporations in the problem of low income housing in the
country. It will stimulate philanthropic activity.
5.1 Description of the Proposed Scheme
Under the proposed scheme, the government will give an incentive for private investors
to provide upfront equity for the development of low income housing by granting them
tax credits over a period of ten years. The value of those annual tax credits will be
calculated in proportion to the subsidies already established by the government relative to
the price of the affordable housing unit (see table 1.4). Figure 5.1 presents a general
diagram of the proposed process. The allocation mechanism of subsidies to low income
families will remain very similar to the current process. However, the change will occur
mainly in the sources of capital available for the subsidies. The process is described in
the following steps:
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1. A government housing agency will still allocate a subsidy to each qualified low
income family. However, this subsidy will be in the form of an annual tax credit
allocation.
2. Low income households will buy affordable housing units offered in the market
by developers. The sources for the purchase will include the traditional down
payment, a residential mortgage secured with a housing and savings corporation,
and an allocation of annual tax credits.
3. The developer will be able to obtain a subsidy equivalent in value to the ones in
table 1A for the exchange of the annual allocation of tax credits per house sold
through a syndicator.
4. Syndicators will create investment funds with the equity provided by corporations
and individuals interested in reducing their tax liabilities. Investors will receive
the right to claim tax credits for a period of 10 years according to their
investment.
Figure 5.1
Pro osed Low Income Housin Tax Credit Process
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5.2 Benefits of the Scheme
Currently the government allocates, from its national annual budget, a certain amount of
funds in order to subsidize the ownership of low income housing. Under the proposed
scheme the government will no longer allocate from its annual budget resources for low
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income housing subsidies, but rather will give grant the same value of annual tax credits
to tax credit equity investors. By doing so the government is actually leveraging itself
indirectly with private capital and hence will be able to promote around five times more
housing units with the same amount of money per year. Of course, there is a cost
associated to this, which is mainly the required rate of return of the tax credit equity
investors. In this case, the risk associated to this type of investment is very low since the
tax credit equity will be provided to the developer only when a property has been sold
and then, the flow of tax credits is guaranteed over a ten year period. The main risk for
an investor will be not to have enough tax liabilities to offset with the tax credits in a
given year during the ten year period. Given that the perceived risk by private investors
is less than in the case of tax credit equity for low income rental housing, the required
rate of return will also be lower. Figure 5.2 shows the annual subsidy per house required
for different required rates of return of the equity investor and for different prices of low
income housing units represented by their respective current subsidy.
Figure 5.2
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Exhibit 5.1 presents the cash flow to the equity investor associated with the investmen!
necessary to promote one low income house that currently receives a subsidy of $5.312
million pesos ($1,815 dollars)24. To promote this type of house will required an annual
subsidy of $1.06 million pesos ($362 dollars) per year for a period often years providing
24 Exchange rate: 2,926.46 pesos per dollar, January 2003
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the investor with an IRR of 11 %. It will also allow the government to promote five times
more housing units with the same amount of money per year.
For example, in the case of Bogota there could be 8,000 subsidies available per year
under the new scheme of subsidies proposed in comparison to the 1,600 subsidies
available today under the subsidy scheme in place.
Even though, there are benefits to the establishment of the new scheme of subsidies
proposed, there are also several difficulties for the implementation of a program like this
one in Colombia:
The biggest difficulty will be to attract private investors to the program. Colombian
corporations could be hesitant to invest since the return to investors will depend from
the ability to shelter tax liabilities during a period of ten years after the investment.
They could worry about their ability to have enough taxable income to shelter with
the tax credits provided with the program for the whole ten year period. If this is the
case, a greater return could be required by investors, and the cost of the program
could increase considerably.
Investors could also be worried for the permanence of the program. They could be
concerned about changes in the central government policy that could jeopardize their
return on the tax credit investment. Once more, they will require a greater return that
could increase the costs of the program considerably.
Obtaining political support for the program could be also hard since currently the
government has a policy to decrease to a minimum all the tax benefits in order to
increase the government's revenue. Besides, to a certain extend some parties might
think that private investors and intermediaries are benefiting in excess from their
investment.
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Exhibit 5.1
lOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS INVESTMENT
CASH FlOWTO EQUITY INVESTOR
DIRECT SUBSIDY PE R HOUSE: $5.312 Mllion
Fi gures in Mi II ion of Pesos 2003
Tax Credit 10.171 1.017 1.017 1.017 1017 1017 1.017 1.017 1.017 1017 1017
Cash Flowto Equity In-..est or 3.921 -6.249 1.017 1.017 1.017 1017 1017 1.017 1.017 1.017 1017 1017
Cumulative -6.2q;;, -5.232 -4.215 -3.198 -2.181 -1.164 -0.147 0.870 1.887 2.904 3.921
IIRR 10Yb1
1.02
5.22
0"1
N
Tax Credit 10.612 1.061 1.061 1.061 1061 1061 1.061 1.061 1.061 1061 1061
Cash Flowto Equity In-..est or 4362 -6.249 1.061 1.061 1.061 1061 1061 1.061 1.061 1.061 1061 1061
Cumulative -6.2q;;, -5.188 -4.127 -3.em -2005 -0.944 0.118 1.179 2.2.::0 3301 4362
IIRR 11%1
1.00
2.:Q!..
Tax Credit 11060 1.106 1.106 1.106 1.106 1.106 1.106 1.106 1.106 1.106 1.106
Cash Flowto Equity In-..est or 4B11 -6.249 1.106 1.106 1.106 1.106 1.106 1.106 1.106 1.106 1.106 1.106
Cumulative -6.2q;;, -5.143 -4.037 -2.931 ·1 B2:5 -0.719 0.387 1.q;;,3 2.~ 3.705 4B11
IIRR 12%1
I
1.11
4.80
CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSION
Given the large low income housing shortage in the Colombia, there is a need for the
study of new alternatives to promote the development of affordable housing. Low
income rental hosing is presented as an alternative to solve the housing needs of the more
needed households in the country. It has been shown, during the development of this
thesis, how an affordable housing policy that supports both ownership and rental of low
income housing is possible to implement in Colombia. Furthennore, by establishing a
subsidy scheme based on tax credits to attract private capital to the development of low
income housing, it is possible to promote several times more housing units with the same
government resources per year.
The development of the capital markets of a country is a key factor for its economic
expansion. Innovative financial mechanisms present in the capital markets facilitate the
growth in all the sectors of an economy by providing access to larger amounts and more
efficient sources of capital. The financing of low income housing is not an exception to
this fact. New financial mechanisms, such as the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
program, will increase the impact of the current government resources of capital available
for housing subsidies in the country.
The final proposal of the thesis is to change the current scheme of subsidies for low
income housing by a new system based on tax credit incentives to private equity investors
in order to leverage the financial resources of the government with private capital. If
30% of the current capital resources per year were allocated to the promotion of low
income rental housing, and 70% to the promotion of affordable housing ownership, the
government could promote up to four times more low income housing units per year with
the proposed tax credit scheme of subsidies. The annual subsidy per low income rental
house could be around $2.24 million pesos ($765 dollars)25 and the annual subsidy for
2S Colombian peso exchange rate: 2,926.46 pesos per dollar, January 2003
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ownership of low income housing could be around $1.06 million pesos ($362 dollars).
(See sensitivity analysis section chapter 4).
There are several positive externalities to the promotion of low income rental housing
and the establishment of a scheme of subsidies based on tax credit incentives. New
economic activities will be stimulated as a result of the change to the proposed subsidy
scheme. The income producing real estate industry will be established in the country,
opening the possibility to the creation in the future of economic activities that will
support it, such as the commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) and the real estate
investment trust (REIT) industries. There will also be direct benefits to the tax credit
equity syndicators and finally to the tax credit equity investors. Furthennore, the increase
in the construction of affordable housing, supported by the government, will help to
decrease the unemployment in the country.
Low income households in the infonnal sector of the economy have limited access to
credit mainly due to the lack of credit history. These families could build their credit
history while living in a multifamily low income rental housing development subsidized
by the government. The real estate investor could be required to report the monthly rent
payments of tenants, so that financial institutions could assess the financial capability of
low income families in the informal sector.
Due to all the benefits described above, it is clear that the proposed change in the scheme
of subsidies in the country will bring several benefits directly to the low income families
and to the country in general.
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